Tuesday, September 04, 2012
Debunking Some Military Myths about the American Revolution
HISTORY
The heroes and events of our war for freedom can be
seen in one of two ways: the people as they were and the events as they
happened, or as romantically embroidered images of them.
Unless we see the past honestly and appreciate what it
can teach us about the present and the future, the painful sacrifices endured
in the cause of liberty will all have been for naught.
How did the colonies manage this?
Although 300,000 Englishmen had entered the military
in the French and Indian War (1754-1763), by 1776 military service had become
so unpopular in Britain
only 20,000 soldiers were available to put down the American rebellion.
Soldier pay was a miserly eight pence a day, and most
of this was deducted for expenses. Brutal noncoms, miserable living conditions
and the discomforts of life aboard transports kept all but the desperately poor
from enlisting. After releasing debtors and criminals from jail, impressing
paupers and vagrants, and offering bounties, the British had to resort to
hiring German mercenaries.
In 1775, the British Navy had a total of 270 ships. By
1783, this number had swelled to 480, of which about 100, mostly frigates and smaller
vessels, were committed to America .
Theoretically, the British should have been able to
crush the Revolution with the Royal Navy and a few marines. In quality, however
the British Navy was in bad shape—reduced by neglect to floating coffins. Officers
and men were substandard, and the Admiralty was headed by Lord Sandwich, an
evil and incompetent politician.
Privateering—the operation of private men of war—was
developed by the colonists. Between 1775 and 1783, American privateers took
about 600 British vessels, including 16 warships. Prize money reached $18
million.
The Myth of the Omnipresent Riflemen
Popular myth has it that the Revolution was fought
between American troops who fired rifles from behind trees and stone walls
against British troops who advanced in stiff formations and were armed with
muskets.
This notion cries out for
debunking. In only a few engagements did rifles play a decisive role.
In military histories, credit is given to the
Americans for raising companies of expert riflemen from among frontiersmen who
had become expert in the use of these weapons.
The truth is the debt is owed to Frederick the Great. After being harassed by
guerrillas during the Seven Years' War, the Prussian king formed his own body
of light infantry, recruiting them from foresters and game keepers. He called
them "Jaegers" (hunters).
Two Jaeger companies were sent to America in 1776
with other German mercenaries, but the British made the mistake of only
occasionally using them as separate units. Instead, they were detached for
special missions such as scouting, headquarters security and sniping.
Because of the characteristic green color of their
uniforms, the Jaegers quickly earned the nickname of "Greencoats."
Interestingly, olive drab, a shade of green is now the characteristic color of
the battle dress of most modern armies.
Misconceptions About Battle Tactics
Before the invention of firearms, phalanx tactics
involving compact bodies of men had been employed on the battlefield. A phalanx was a formation
carrying overlapping shields and long lances, developed by Philip II of Macedon
and used with great success by Alexander the Great. These tactics were successful because the
principal weapons were the spear and the sword.
The advent of firearms
brought linear tactics to the battlefield. The line of battle at the time of
the Revolution consisted of two or three close ranks standing shoulder to
shoulder, with another rank of "file closers" about six paces behind
to replace casualties.
Thanks to the training of
German drillmaster Gen. Friedrich Wilhelm Augustus von Steuben, American troops
were eventually able to hold their own in the accepted European fashion in
engagements using linear tactics.
Most shoulder weapons used
during the Revolution were smoothbore muskets, although both sides had special
units of riflemen. Much has been made of the musket's inherent lack of
accuracy, but the linear tactics of the period took its inaccuracy into
account.
Maintaining alignment and
with bayonets fixed, the attackers would move forward, secure in the knowledge
that they were comparatively safe from enemy musket fire until about a hundred
yards from the opposing force—about the length of a modern football field.
Officers tried to maintain enough discipline to get their men hold their fire
until they were within 50 yards of the enemy.
The famous order at Bunker Hill , "Don't one of you fire until you see
the whites of their eyes," was not intended to win a place in books of
quotations. It was an admonition that could only have been intended for men
armed with muskets.
Loading a
Musket
To load a musket, each soldier had to bite off the twisted
end of a paper cartridge containing black powder and a lead ball, exposing
himself in a standing position while pushing it down the barrel with a long
ramrod. Next, the firing pan had to be primed by shaking in loose powder,
taking care that the wind did not blow it away. Finally, the shooter had to
make certain that the flint was firmly in position to strike a good spark when
a pull of the trigger brought it into contact with the steel jaws of the pan.
The lead ball, an awesome
three-quarters of an inch in diameter, could tear gaping holes in flesh and break
bones. With the primitive quality of military medicine and in the absence of
battlefield nursing care, almost any wound from a musket ball would have a fatal
outcome.
Volley firing, in which all
troops discharged their weapons simultaneously, was the common practice. On
average, troops could reload and fire every 20 to 30 seconds. At the distances
involved, this would assure at least two volleys directed at a charging enemy.
All loading and firing was
done on command. Modern soldiers would call it "by the numbers." The
first volley was always the most effective because it would have been properly
loaded in leisurely fashion before bayonets were fixed.
After about two volleys had
been exchanged, both sides resorted to bayonets--if they had them. Precision
aiming was unknown. Rapidity of fire was more desirable than accuracy.
Each opposing force was a
continuous linear body of men--perfect targets for volley fire. Under the
circumstances, training in marksmanship was unnecessary. American marksmanship
was bad and British marksmanship was almost nonexistent.
At Lexington
and Concord , it
is recorded that "only one American bullet out of 300 found its mark and
only one man out of 15 hit anybody."
Speed was the objective:
speed for the defenders to get off as many rounds as possible; speed for the
attackers to close with their adversaries and use their bayonets before they
took too many casualties.
The practice was to advance
in parade formation and withstand the first volley, taking losses
unflinchingly. Next, with the thinned ranks closed up and before the enemy
could reload, the response was a volley fired from a closer distance. Finally
came the charge with bayonets and hand-to-hand combat.
No wonder so many acts of
heroism are recorded. It took men of great courage and fortitude to stand up to
this kind of fighting. With most of the troops on both sides equipped with
smooth-bore muskets and employing linear battle tactics, a low level of
marksmanship was probably adequate. Had America indeed been "a nation
of riflemen," the war would have been over much sooner.