Tuesday, August 01, 2006
More Myths of the American Revolution: Setting the Record Straight
HISTORY
Continuing an examination of the truthfulness of accepted facts about the Revolutionary War, we are confronted by more fictions:
Ethan Allen's Surrender Demand
In the small hours of the morning of May 10, 1775, when the American Revolution was hardly a month old, Ethan Allen and his Green Mountain Boys surprised poorly guarded Fort Ticonderoga. Later, Allen described how his men had occupied the parade ground without being detected by sentries and stood back-to-back facing the barracks in which the little garrison was still asleep.
British Lt. Jocelyn Feltham recalled that he was awakened by rude shouts of "No quarter! No quarter!" and hurried to the quarters of the commander, Capt. William de la Place, trousers in hand. By then, Allen was ascending the barracks stairway, thundering for the fort's surrender "in the name of the Great Jehovah and the Continental Congress"--or so he later insisted in his written recollection of the affair. A latter-day historian made the wry observation that "he had no commission from either of these high authorities."
Other witnesses remember a saltier folk version and the command to "Come out, you damned old rat.' De la Place appeared and agreed to surrender the fort, additionally persuaded by the muskets pointed at him by Allen's men. Benedict Arnold was present at this action and shared command with Allen, an example of the looseness of control during the early days of the conflict.
The capture of Ticonderoga deprived the British of what could have been an important northern base of operations during the coming struggle. It also supplied Washington with serviceable cannon, mortars and howitzers. Using these, transported to outside of Boston by Gen. Henry Knox, he was able to drive the British out of Boston the next winter.
The "Selling" of Ft. Ticonderoga
In July of 1777, British Gen. John Burgoyne easily recaptured Fort Ticonderoga, which had been strengthened and dubbed "the Gibraltar of America." Many stories began circulating to account for its sudden and almost bloodless fall. One story had it that Burgoyne, nicknamed "Gentleman Johnny," had literally bought the victory by firing silver balls into the confines of the fort. Continental General Arthur St.Clair is supposed to have collected them and shared them with the patrician American commander in Albany, Gen. Philip Schuyler.
Ridiculous as this story was, it was widely believed, especially in New England, where Schuyler, scion of New York's oldest and wealthiest families, was roundly disliked for having supported New York's claims in its boundary dispute with Massachusetts and New Hampshire over territory that was later to become Vermont. Even solid and wise John Adams gave some credence to the story and repeated it to his wife, Abigail.
The truth of the matter was that American commander General St.Clair made a crucial error in preparing the defenses of the fort. Although Gen. Horatio Gates had pointed out that the fort could easily be bombarded from the heights of nearby Sugarloaf Hill (Mount Defiance), St.Clair neglected to occupy it. The attacking British did not make the same mistake. Soon artillery under British Gen. William Phillips was pouring a devastating fire down on the American defenders, who were obliged to retreat from the fort under cover of darkness.
The Hessians of Hessian Hill
Repetition of inaccurate information often embeds it in local history. Hessian Hill, north of Mt. Airy, in the village of Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y., takes its name because local legend says Hessian troops were quartered there during the winter of 1779-80. The village historical society's history of the community repeats this as fact, but the time frame is wrong. Hessian troops indeed may have occupied it during the summer months of 1779, but they were long gone before the winter of 1779-1780.
British General Sir Henry Clinton sailed up the Hudson in a fleet of some 70 vessels on May 30, 1779, with an army of about 5,000. Clinton's troops occupied Stony Point on the west bank. A force under British Gen. John Vaughan landed at Verplanck Point on June 1st and captured its Fort Lafayette.
Stony Point was recaptured by the patriots under Mad Anthony Wayne a month and a half later on July 16, 1779, in an impressive victory that had been planned by George Washington. Wayne later swore that he would storm hell if Washington made the preparations. After Washington reinforced American troops at Peekskill, the British withdrew from the area north of the Croton River and abandoned Verplanck Point on October 21st, well before the cold of winter set in.
Were German Mercenaries only Hessians?
No. Although many German mercenaries were from Hesse-Kassel and Hesse-Hanau, although other states, especially Brunswick, also supplied troops. One explanation why all German troops were incorrectly called "Hessians" may lie in the fact that their three successive commanders were all Hessians.
The practice of hiring foreign soldiers was common up to the 18th century, although mercenaries could not keep Constantinople from falling to the Turks in the 15th century. Most small professional armies found it necessary to employ auxiliaries in foreign wars of long duration. Only 17,313 of the 29,867 German soldiers who reached these shores returned home. About five thousand deserted and another 7,754 found graves in America, from disease as well as battle.
German mercenaries were despised for their cruelty, even by the British. They gained no battle laurels in America and did not win a single battle in which they were exclusively pitted against Americans. The most notable German defeats included their Christmas surprise at Trenton, N.J., their drubbing at Bennington, Vt., and General Knyphausen's failed raid against American forces under Gen. Nathanael Greene at Springfield, N.J.
Instead of learning from their experiences in America, German mercenaries returned home unshaken in their faith in the outmoded military tactics of Frederick the Great and the myth of their own invincibility. This illusion persisted until an October day in 1806 when Napoleon crushed two great Prussian armies in a matter of hours in twin victories at Jena and Auerstadt. Ruthless efficiency on the battlefield had given way to precision on the parade ground with disastrous results.
The Accidental Heroes
In New York during the Revolution, present-day Westchester County's fertile farms were looted so often by both sides the inhabitants frequently became looters themselves, if only to survive. The countryside eventually became a sinister wasteland full of marauding bands of outlaws. Many of its guerrillas switched allegiance between rebel and loyalist as circumstances suited them.
On the 23rd of September in 1780, British Major John André rode down the Albany Post Road toward the British lines at Dobbs Ferry disguised as a civilian. Concealed in each of his stockings were plans and descriptions of the defenses at West Point. These had been handed to him by Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold, commander of the American stronghold, in a clandestine meeting in the woods south of Stony Point. In addition, André carried a pass personally written by Arnold asking American patrols to allow "John Anderson" passage "to the White Plains, or below if he chooses." André was no stranger to American ways. He had been captured in St. Johns during the abortive American invasion of Canada and had spent a year in Pennsylvania as a prisoner.
The plan had been for André to return to the British armed sloop Vulture that had brought him upriver for the meeting. When it was discovered that the ship waiting off Croton Point was within cannon shot, Col. James Livingston, who commanded American forces in this area, brought two cannon from Verplanck Point and directed fire at the Vulture from Croton Point, a promontory jutting far out into the Hudson. The British ship weighed anchor and sailed hastily down the river, leaving Andre‚ to fend for himself and return to British-held New York City on horseback.
Making his way back, he was challenged in Tarrytown by John Paulding, Isaac Van Wart and David Williams, members of an impromptu patriot patrol. André made the mistake of assuming they were Loyalists. Actually they were "volunteer militiamen" operating under a recently enacted New York law permitting them to claim property found on a captured enemy. They took him into the woods, strip-searched him and found the incriminating papers in his stockings. Lofty patriotic motives were later attributed to them, but their real reason probably was booty. The captors later sold André's silver watch, horse and bridle, and divided the money among the seven in their party.
In part because of the way the British had treated American spy Nathan Hale, André was tried swiftly and hanged at Tappan, N.Y., only nine days later. Paulding, Van Wart and Smith were each given the thanks of Congress, a silver medal, and an annual payment of $200.
In 1817, when Paulding applied to Congress for an increase in the amount of his annuity, Benjamin Tallmadge, a member of Congress from Connecticut, opposed any increase because Paulding and his companions had been amply rewarded for the patriotism they showed in making André a prisoner.
Tallmadge, who had headed George Washington's secret service, presented evidence based on his interrogation of André. The British spy had asserted that the three Americans had ripped up his saddle and the cape of his coat in search of money. Finding none, one of the party suggested, "He may have it in his boots." Ironically, it was their search for money that led to the discovery of the papers that sealed his fate.
The Myth of the Omnipresent Riflemen
In military histories, credit is given to the Americans for raising companies of expert riflemen from among frontiersmen who had become expert in the use of these weapons. The truth is, militarily speaking, the debt is owed to Frederick the Great. After being harassed by guerrillas during the Seven Years' War, the Prussian king formed his own body of light infantry, recruiting them from foresters and game keepers. He called them "Jaegers" (hunters).
Two Jaeger companies were sent to America in 1776 with other German mercenaries. They proved so useful that in a special treaty, the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel agreed to increase the numbers of Jaegers in the mercenary forces he was supplying to the British.
Although the Jaegers from Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Hanau and Anspach were eventually formed into a corps and put under the command of Lt.-Col. Ludwig von Wurm, they seldom operated as such. Instead, they were detached for special missions such as reconnaissance, headquarters security, scouting and sniping from the front lines during sieges of American positions. Because of the characteristic green color of their uniforms, the Jaegers quickly earned the nickname of "Greencoats." Interestingly, a shade of green is now the characteristic color of the uniforms of most modern armies.
Myths about Militia
Large standing armies represent a relatively recent innovation in the art of warfare. The almost continuous wars in America in the hundred years before the Revolution were fought by British troops, reinforced by local militia called "Provincials" by the British. Battles against the rebelling colonists during the Revolution were fought by British regulars, German mercenaries and Tory militia. Professional British military men tended to take a dim view of the capabilities of the colonial militia. Yet during the American Revolution, it was these same militiamen who gathered so quickly at Lexington and Concord, who placed Boston under siege, who fought at Bunker Hill, and who formed the nucleus of the fledgling Continental Army.
At the same time, because they were part-time soldiers subject to their home state's authority, militia units often were unreliable. After the battle of Long Island, of the 8,000 Connecticut militiamen serving under Washington in August of 1776, only 2,000 could be located after the evacuation to Manhattan. The others had simply drifted away and went back home.
Just before the second battle of Saratoga in 1777--the engagement that was the turning point of the Revolution--men of Gen. John Stark's New Hampshire militia, only recently the heroes at the battle of Bennington, joined Gen. Horatio Gates's command one morning--but jeopardized the eventual victory by leaving before noon because their enlistments were up. "Few events in the war so proved the utter failure of the militia system," an American historian later wrote.
Misconceptions About Battle Tactics
Popular myth has it that the Revolution was fought between American troops who fired rifles from behind trees and stone walls against British troops who advanced in stiff formations and were armed with muskets. This notion cries out for debunking. In only a few engagements did rifles play a decisive role.
Thanks to the training of German drillmaster Gen. Friedrich Wilhelm Augustus von Steuben, American troops fought in the accepted European fashion. The running battle at Lexington and Concord and the encircling battle at King's Mountain, South Carolina, were notable exceptions. Before the invention of firearms, phalanx tactics involving compact bodies of men were used on the battlefield. These were successful because the principal weapons were the lance and the sword.
Most shoulder weapons used during the Revolution were smoothbore muskets, although both sides employed special units of riflemen. Much has been made of the musket's inherent lack of accuracy, but the linear tactics of the period took its inaccuracy into account. The line of battle consisted of two or three close ranks standing shoulder to shoulder, with another rank of "file closers" about six paces behind to replace casualties.
Maintaining alignment and with bayonets fixed, the attackers would move forward, secure in the knowledge that they were comparatively safe from enemy musket fire until about a hundred yards from the opposing force. Officers endeavored to maintain enough discipline to make their men hold their fire until they were within 50 yards of the enemy. The famous order at Bunker Hill, "Don't one of you fire until you see the whites of their eyes," was not intended to win a place in books of quotations. It was an admonition that could only have been intended for men armed with muskets. Historians cannot agree about who gave this command, Gen. Israel Putnam or Col. William Prescott, although the nod is usually given to the latter.
Each soldier had to bite off the end of a paper cartridge, exposing himself in a standing position while pushing it down the barrel with a long ramrod. Then the ball and a paper wad had to be rammed tightly to avoid leakage of the propelling explosive gases. Next, the firing pan had to be primed by shaking in loose powder, taking care that the wind did not blow it away. Finally, the shooter had to make certain that the flint was firmly in position to strike a good spark when a pull of the trigger brought it into contact with the steel jaws of the pan. The bullet, a lead ball with an awesome diameter of three-quarters of an inch, tore gaping holes in flesh and broke bones. With the primitive quality of military medicine and the absence of battlefield nursing care, almost any wound from a musket ball could have fatal consequences. Volley firing--in which all troops discharged their weapons simultaneously--was the common practice. On average, troops could reload and fire every twenty to thirty seconds. At the distances involved, this would assure at least two volleys at a charging enemy.
All loading and firing was done on command--modern soldiers would call it "by the numbers." The first volley was always the most effective because it would have been properly loaded in leisurely fashion before the bayonet had been fixed. After about two volleys had been exchanged, both sides resorted to bayonets--if they had them. Precision aiming was unknown. Rapidity of fire was more desirable than accuracy. Each opposing force was a continuous linear body of men--perfect targets for volley fire. Under the circumstances, training in marksmanship was unnecessary. At Lexington and Concord, it is recorded that "only one American bullet out of 300 found its mark and only one man out of 15 hit anybody." Speed was the objective: speed for the defenders to get off as many rounds as possible; speed for the attackers to close with their adversaries and use their bayonets before they took too many casualties.
The practice was to advance in parade formation and withstand the first volley, taking losses unflinchingly. Then, with the thinned ranks closed up and before the enemy could reload, the response was a volley as fired from a closer distance. Finally came the charge with bayonets and hand-to-hand combat. No wonder so many acts of heroism are recorded. It took men of great courage and fortitude to stand up to this kind of fighting. With most of the troops on both sides equipped with smooth-bore muskets and employing linear battle tactics, the general low level of marksmanship was probably adequate. Had America indeed been "a nation of riflemen," the war would have been over much sooner.
The heroes and events of our history can be seen in one of two ways: the people as they were and the events as they happened, or as a romantically embroidered picture of them. Unless we see the past honestly and appreciate what it can teach us about the present and the future, the painful sacrifices endured in the cause of liberty will all have been for naught.
Continuing an examination of the truthfulness of accepted facts about the Revolutionary War, we are confronted by more fictions:
Ethan Allen's Surrender Demand
In the small hours of the morning of May 10, 1775, when the American Revolution was hardly a month old, Ethan Allen and his Green Mountain Boys surprised poorly guarded Fort Ticonderoga. Later, Allen described how his men had occupied the parade ground without being detected by sentries and stood back-to-back facing the barracks in which the little garrison was still asleep.
British Lt. Jocelyn Feltham recalled that he was awakened by rude shouts of "No quarter! No quarter!" and hurried to the quarters of the commander, Capt. William de la Place, trousers in hand. By then, Allen was ascending the barracks stairway, thundering for the fort's surrender "in the name of the Great Jehovah and the Continental Congress"--or so he later insisted in his written recollection of the affair. A latter-day historian made the wry observation that "he had no commission from either of these high authorities."
Other witnesses remember a saltier folk version and the command to "Come out, you damned old rat.' De la Place appeared and agreed to surrender the fort, additionally persuaded by the muskets pointed at him by Allen's men. Benedict Arnold was present at this action and shared command with Allen, an example of the looseness of control during the early days of the conflict.
The capture of Ticonderoga deprived the British of what could have been an important northern base of operations during the coming struggle. It also supplied Washington with serviceable cannon, mortars and howitzers. Using these, transported to outside of Boston by Gen. Henry Knox, he was able to drive the British out of Boston the next winter.
The "Selling" of Ft. Ticonderoga
In July of 1777, British Gen. John Burgoyne easily recaptured Fort Ticonderoga, which had been strengthened and dubbed "the Gibraltar of America." Many stories began circulating to account for its sudden and almost bloodless fall. One story had it that Burgoyne, nicknamed "Gentleman Johnny," had literally bought the victory by firing silver balls into the confines of the fort. Continental General Arthur St.Clair is supposed to have collected them and shared them with the patrician American commander in Albany, Gen. Philip Schuyler.
Ridiculous as this story was, it was widely believed, especially in New England, where Schuyler, scion of New York's oldest and wealthiest families, was roundly disliked for having supported New York's claims in its boundary dispute with Massachusetts and New Hampshire over territory that was later to become Vermont. Even solid and wise John Adams gave some credence to the story and repeated it to his wife, Abigail.
The truth of the matter was that American commander General St.Clair made a crucial error in preparing the defenses of the fort. Although Gen. Horatio Gates had pointed out that the fort could easily be bombarded from the heights of nearby Sugarloaf Hill (Mount Defiance), St.Clair neglected to occupy it. The attacking British did not make the same mistake. Soon artillery under British Gen. William Phillips was pouring a devastating fire down on the American defenders, who were obliged to retreat from the fort under cover of darkness.
The Hessians of Hessian Hill
Repetition of inaccurate information often embeds it in local history. Hessian Hill, north of Mt. Airy, in the village of Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y., takes its name because local legend says Hessian troops were quartered there during the winter of 1779-80. The village historical society's history of the community repeats this as fact, but the time frame is wrong. Hessian troops indeed may have occupied it during the summer months of 1779, but they were long gone before the winter of 1779-1780.
British General Sir Henry Clinton sailed up the Hudson in a fleet of some 70 vessels on May 30, 1779, with an army of about 5,000. Clinton's troops occupied Stony Point on the west bank. A force under British Gen. John Vaughan landed at Verplanck Point on June 1st and captured its Fort Lafayette.
Stony Point was recaptured by the patriots under Mad Anthony Wayne a month and a half later on July 16, 1779, in an impressive victory that had been planned by George Washington. Wayne later swore that he would storm hell if Washington made the preparations. After Washington reinforced American troops at Peekskill, the British withdrew from the area north of the Croton River and abandoned Verplanck Point on October 21st, well before the cold of winter set in.
Were German Mercenaries only Hessians?
No. Although many German mercenaries were from Hesse-Kassel and Hesse-Hanau, although other states, especially Brunswick, also supplied troops. One explanation why all German troops were incorrectly called "Hessians" may lie in the fact that their three successive commanders were all Hessians.
The practice of hiring foreign soldiers was common up to the 18th century, although mercenaries could not keep Constantinople from falling to the Turks in the 15th century. Most small professional armies found it necessary to employ auxiliaries in foreign wars of long duration. Only 17,313 of the 29,867 German soldiers who reached these shores returned home. About five thousand deserted and another 7,754 found graves in America, from disease as well as battle.
German mercenaries were despised for their cruelty, even by the British. They gained no battle laurels in America and did not win a single battle in which they were exclusively pitted against Americans. The most notable German defeats included their Christmas surprise at Trenton, N.J., their drubbing at Bennington, Vt., and General Knyphausen's failed raid against American forces under Gen. Nathanael Greene at Springfield, N.J.
Instead of learning from their experiences in America, German mercenaries returned home unshaken in their faith in the outmoded military tactics of Frederick the Great and the myth of their own invincibility. This illusion persisted until an October day in 1806 when Napoleon crushed two great Prussian armies in a matter of hours in twin victories at Jena and Auerstadt. Ruthless efficiency on the battlefield had given way to precision on the parade ground with disastrous results.
The Accidental Heroes
In New York during the Revolution, present-day Westchester County's fertile farms were looted so often by both sides the inhabitants frequently became looters themselves, if only to survive. The countryside eventually became a sinister wasteland full of marauding bands of outlaws. Many of its guerrillas switched allegiance between rebel and loyalist as circumstances suited them.
On the 23rd of September in 1780, British Major John André rode down the Albany Post Road toward the British lines at Dobbs Ferry disguised as a civilian. Concealed in each of his stockings were plans and descriptions of the defenses at West Point. These had been handed to him by Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold, commander of the American stronghold, in a clandestine meeting in the woods south of Stony Point. In addition, André carried a pass personally written by Arnold asking American patrols to allow "John Anderson" passage "to the White Plains, or below if he chooses." André was no stranger to American ways. He had been captured in St. Johns during the abortive American invasion of Canada and had spent a year in Pennsylvania as a prisoner.
The plan had been for André to return to the British armed sloop Vulture that had brought him upriver for the meeting. When it was discovered that the ship waiting off Croton Point was within cannon shot, Col. James Livingston, who commanded American forces in this area, brought two cannon from Verplanck Point and directed fire at the Vulture from Croton Point, a promontory jutting far out into the Hudson. The British ship weighed anchor and sailed hastily down the river, leaving Andre‚ to fend for himself and return to British-held New York City on horseback.
Making his way back, he was challenged in Tarrytown by John Paulding, Isaac Van Wart and David Williams, members of an impromptu patriot patrol. André made the mistake of assuming they were Loyalists. Actually they were "volunteer militiamen" operating under a recently enacted New York law permitting them to claim property found on a captured enemy. They took him into the woods, strip-searched him and found the incriminating papers in his stockings. Lofty patriotic motives were later attributed to them, but their real reason probably was booty. The captors later sold André's silver watch, horse and bridle, and divided the money among the seven in their party.
In part because of the way the British had treated American spy Nathan Hale, André was tried swiftly and hanged at Tappan, N.Y., only nine days later. Paulding, Van Wart and Smith were each given the thanks of Congress, a silver medal, and an annual payment of $200.
In 1817, when Paulding applied to Congress for an increase in the amount of his annuity, Benjamin Tallmadge, a member of Congress from Connecticut, opposed any increase because Paulding and his companions had been amply rewarded for the patriotism they showed in making André a prisoner.
Tallmadge, who had headed George Washington's secret service, presented evidence based on his interrogation of André. The British spy had asserted that the three Americans had ripped up his saddle and the cape of his coat in search of money. Finding none, one of the party suggested, "He may have it in his boots." Ironically, it was their search for money that led to the discovery of the papers that sealed his fate.
The Myth of the Omnipresent Riflemen
In military histories, credit is given to the Americans for raising companies of expert riflemen from among frontiersmen who had become expert in the use of these weapons. The truth is, militarily speaking, the debt is owed to Frederick the Great. After being harassed by guerrillas during the Seven Years' War, the Prussian king formed his own body of light infantry, recruiting them from foresters and game keepers. He called them "Jaegers" (hunters).
Two Jaeger companies were sent to America in 1776 with other German mercenaries. They proved so useful that in a special treaty, the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel agreed to increase the numbers of Jaegers in the mercenary forces he was supplying to the British.
Although the Jaegers from Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Hanau and Anspach were eventually formed into a corps and put under the command of Lt.-Col. Ludwig von Wurm, they seldom operated as such. Instead, they were detached for special missions such as reconnaissance, headquarters security, scouting and sniping from the front lines during sieges of American positions. Because of the characteristic green color of their uniforms, the Jaegers quickly earned the nickname of "Greencoats." Interestingly, a shade of green is now the characteristic color of the uniforms of most modern armies.
Myths about Militia
Large standing armies represent a relatively recent innovation in the art of warfare. The almost continuous wars in America in the hundred years before the Revolution were fought by British troops, reinforced by local militia called "Provincials" by the British. Battles against the rebelling colonists during the Revolution were fought by British regulars, German mercenaries and Tory militia. Professional British military men tended to take a dim view of the capabilities of the colonial militia. Yet during the American Revolution, it was these same militiamen who gathered so quickly at Lexington and Concord, who placed Boston under siege, who fought at Bunker Hill, and who formed the nucleus of the fledgling Continental Army.
At the same time, because they were part-time soldiers subject to their home state's authority, militia units often were unreliable. After the battle of Long Island, of the 8,000 Connecticut militiamen serving under Washington in August of 1776, only 2,000 could be located after the evacuation to Manhattan. The others had simply drifted away and went back home.
Just before the second battle of Saratoga in 1777--the engagement that was the turning point of the Revolution--men of Gen. John Stark's New Hampshire militia, only recently the heroes at the battle of Bennington, joined Gen. Horatio Gates's command one morning--but jeopardized the eventual victory by leaving before noon because their enlistments were up. "Few events in the war so proved the utter failure of the militia system," an American historian later wrote.
Misconceptions About Battle Tactics
Popular myth has it that the Revolution was fought between American troops who fired rifles from behind trees and stone walls against British troops who advanced in stiff formations and were armed with muskets. This notion cries out for debunking. In only a few engagements did rifles play a decisive role.
Thanks to the training of German drillmaster Gen. Friedrich Wilhelm Augustus von Steuben, American troops fought in the accepted European fashion. The running battle at Lexington and Concord and the encircling battle at King's Mountain, South Carolina, were notable exceptions. Before the invention of firearms, phalanx tactics involving compact bodies of men were used on the battlefield. These were successful because the principal weapons were the lance and the sword.
Most shoulder weapons used during the Revolution were smoothbore muskets, although both sides employed special units of riflemen. Much has been made of the musket's inherent lack of accuracy, but the linear tactics of the period took its inaccuracy into account. The line of battle consisted of two or three close ranks standing shoulder to shoulder, with another rank of "file closers" about six paces behind to replace casualties.
Maintaining alignment and with bayonets fixed, the attackers would move forward, secure in the knowledge that they were comparatively safe from enemy musket fire until about a hundred yards from the opposing force. Officers endeavored to maintain enough discipline to make their men hold their fire until they were within 50 yards of the enemy. The famous order at Bunker Hill, "Don't one of you fire until you see the whites of their eyes," was not intended to win a place in books of quotations. It was an admonition that could only have been intended for men armed with muskets. Historians cannot agree about who gave this command, Gen. Israel Putnam or Col. William Prescott, although the nod is usually given to the latter.
Each soldier had to bite off the end of a paper cartridge, exposing himself in a standing position while pushing it down the barrel with a long ramrod. Then the ball and a paper wad had to be rammed tightly to avoid leakage of the propelling explosive gases. Next, the firing pan had to be primed by shaking in loose powder, taking care that the wind did not blow it away. Finally, the shooter had to make certain that the flint was firmly in position to strike a good spark when a pull of the trigger brought it into contact with the steel jaws of the pan. The bullet, a lead ball with an awesome diameter of three-quarters of an inch, tore gaping holes in flesh and broke bones. With the primitive quality of military medicine and the absence of battlefield nursing care, almost any wound from a musket ball could have fatal consequences. Volley firing--in which all troops discharged their weapons simultaneously--was the common practice. On average, troops could reload and fire every twenty to thirty seconds. At the distances involved, this would assure at least two volleys at a charging enemy.
All loading and firing was done on command--modern soldiers would call it "by the numbers." The first volley was always the most effective because it would have been properly loaded in leisurely fashion before the bayonet had been fixed. After about two volleys had been exchanged, both sides resorted to bayonets--if they had them. Precision aiming was unknown. Rapidity of fire was more desirable than accuracy. Each opposing force was a continuous linear body of men--perfect targets for volley fire. Under the circumstances, training in marksmanship was unnecessary. At Lexington and Concord, it is recorded that "only one American bullet out of 300 found its mark and only one man out of 15 hit anybody." Speed was the objective: speed for the defenders to get off as many rounds as possible; speed for the attackers to close with their adversaries and use their bayonets before they took too many casualties.
The practice was to advance in parade formation and withstand the first volley, taking losses unflinchingly. Then, with the thinned ranks closed up and before the enemy could reload, the response was a volley as fired from a closer distance. Finally came the charge with bayonets and hand-to-hand combat. No wonder so many acts of heroism are recorded. It took men of great courage and fortitude to stand up to this kind of fighting. With most of the troops on both sides equipped with smooth-bore muskets and employing linear battle tactics, the general low level of marksmanship was probably adequate. Had America indeed been "a nation of riflemen," the war would have been over much sooner.
The heroes and events of our history can be seen in one of two ways: the people as they were and the events as they happened, or as a romantically embroidered picture of them. Unless we see the past honestly and appreciate what it can teach us about the present and the future, the painful sacrifices endured in the cause of liberty will all have been for naught.
Labels: American Revolution, History
